

BARRE, VT.
TIMES-ARGUS

E - 12,353
APR 25 1972

Can't Justify Bombing

If reports published in Newsweek are true, then the Nixon administration is even more guilty of misleading the American public than at first believed.

Those reports say the Nixon administration in 1969 ordered a secret appraisal on the effectiveness of bombing of North Vietnam.

The result of that appraisal — stamped secret — was the State Department wrote the bombing had plainly not "paralyzed" Hanoi; the Defense Department pointed out the bombing only seemed to have rallied the people behind Hanoi; the Central Intelligence Agency concluded "the air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

On the basis of those conclusions, how in heaven's name can the Nixon administration possibly justify bombing North Vietnam in April of 1972.

We are bombing towns and villages in South Vietnam off the face of the map now to "save" them.

Are we going to do the same with all of North Vietnam to "win" the war?—KLR

April Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350074-3

NOMINATIONS PLACED ON THE SECRETARY'S DESK

The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to read sundry nominations in the Air Force, in the Army, and in the Navy, which had been placed on the Secretary's desk.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, the nominations are considered and confirmed en bloc.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be immediately notified of the confirmation of the nominations today.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered.

LEGISLATIVE SESSION

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the consideration of legislative business.

The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business.

ORDER OF BUSINESS

Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I have no request for further time.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, seeing the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL) on the floor, and having read certain reports in the newspapers this morning, I should like to direct an inquiry to him in the hope that he might answer it.

I wonder whether it is true, as the newspapers report, that the Senator from Alaska intends, when he gets the floor, to read into the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Government documents which are classified secret.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, my intention is to ask unanimous consent to place the documents in the RECORD, I think they are relevant to what is going on in Indochina today.

I came into possession of these documents some time ago and have been studying them diligently.

When I was 23 years old, I was a top-secret officer. I feel that my judgment has improved since then. I have evaluated the documents carefully, and I feel they contain no military information or other information that would jeopardize the safety of this country. But I feel that the documents do have a great deal of information about the political decisionmaking process that took place in 1969, and from that time until today.

I, like many other citizens, am concerned over what is happening today in Vietnam and, for that reason, I feel it is important to give my colleagues this political information, which casts a new light on the activities that are taking place in Vietnam today.

So I feel it is my constitutional obligation as a U.S. Senator, and in line with the oath of office I took to uphold the Constitution of the United States from internal and external threats, that I point out the domestic threat in the policy that is being implemented today. It is very important to fulfill my constitutional function to inform the people of my con-

stituency and to inform my colleagues, to ask to have this matter placed in the RECORD so that everyone can read it and make his own judgment on the information.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I take it, then, that the Senator's answer to my question, as to whether he intends to read Government documents classified as secret, is yes.

Mr. GRAVEL. I think my colleague misunderstands my statement. My statement was that I would ask unanimous consent to insert it into the RECORD. I would be surprised and deeply chagrined if someone objected to that unanimous-consent request, because that would mean that person would like to deny information to his colleagues or to the American people, information I feel is vital at this point in our history.

Mr. GRIFFIN. I thank the Senator from Alaska for his response.

Mr. President, a parliamentary inquiry.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Michigan will state it.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Notwithstanding the consent order previously entered into, which allocates 15 minutes of time to the distinguished Senator from Alaska (Mr. GRAVEL), would a motion be in order under the rules to have the Senate go into a closed session

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. A motion to go into closed session would be in order at any time.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Would it be in order, even if the distinguished Senator from Alaska had the floor and was in the process of reading documents into the RECORD?

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the precedents of the Senate, even though a Senator has been allotted time, he could be taken from the floor long enough for such a motion to be made.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, of course I do not know what these various documents involve. However, I think it would be very unfortunate if the Senator from Alaska should seek to take it upon himself solely to be the judge of the classification or declassification of highly sensitive papers. If he does seek unanimous consent to have such classified material printed in the RECORD, I want him to know that I will be constrained to object. Furthermore, if he should proceed to use his 15 minutes for the purpose of reading the material on the floor, I believe I owe an obligation to the Senate at such a time to seek recognition for the purpose of moving that the Senate go into a closed session so that the whole Senate will be apprised of what the Senator from Alaska is doing.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. At this time, in accordance with the previous order, the Chair recognizes the distinguished Senator from Alaska for not to exceed 15 minutes.

CERTAIN CLASSIFIED VIETNAM DOCUMENTS

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, to clarify the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Michigan, he would move that the Senate go into closed session and not executive session.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator is correct.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I have in my possession documents that I think are vital to the safety and well-being of this democracy. I ask unanimous consent that those documents be printed at this place in the RECORD.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection?

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I object.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection is heard. The Senator may not have the material printed in the RECORD.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, as I understand the rules, I cannot move to have these documents printed in the RECORD. Under the rules the only way that I can proceed to get them in the RECORD is to proceed to read them and entertain objection. Prior to that time, I would like, if my colleague would accommodate me with this courtesy, to at least have my speech printed in the RECORD so that I might then have a colloquy with him.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, may I have the assurance of the Senator from Alaska that the speech does not contain material that is classified.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, the speech has four quotations from the material. That is all there is. There is no document contained in the speech or in my introductory remarks. And I think that we have had some experience with my introductory remarks in the past.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, the Senator does quote from the classified information in his remarks; is that correct?

Mr. GRAVEL. Yes, that is correct. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have my remarks printed at this point in the RECORD.

Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I object.

Mr. GRAVEL. Mr. President, I think it is clear at this point that the Republican minority in the Senate does not want to see this information made available to the American public and to the Senate. I have had a copy of it made available to the Senators on the floor and will pass it to any Senator who comes to the floor. I also have had one delivered to the Presiding Officer.

The initial documents cover the policy activities involved. Other Senators have received copies of the study.

It is most unfortunate that this most deliberative body in the world is party to covering up and hiding information that has been hidden by the executive. I say unfortunate because this information should have been made known to the American people at its very inception. What it shows is that the Chief Executive of this country, upon entering office, wanted to equip himself with the information necessary. He had this information in hand, and then he implemented his policy.

Mr. President, there are two facets to the information. One involves the bombing. There were two views in the administration relevant to the bombing. One was that the bombing was not effective. That was the opinion of the Central Intelligence Agency, an agency that has an excellent track record. The other was that the bombing was possibly effective.

'69 Report to Nixon Was Split on War

Tone Pessimistic

By Murray Marder

Washington Post Staff Writer

President Nixon received "profoundly different" judgments from key government agencies at the start of his administration about the state of the war in Vietnam, the consequences of a Communist takeover, and the actions he was urged to take.

This is disclosed in the summary of a government survey ordered by the President on Jan. 21, 1969, the day after his inauguration. The study was National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, assembled by the National Security Council staff headed by presidential adviser Henry A. Kissinger.

Many of the conclusions and recommendations in it have been altered or overtaken by events in the intervening three years of U.S. troop withdrawals from South Vietnam and international shifts of position by China and the Soviet Union in their relationships with the United States. But some of the findings shed light on new actions now unfolding, such as the current Communist offensive and the renewed U.S. bombing of North Vietnam's heartland.

One of the most striking disclosures in the study is the evidence it contains of great splits inside the federal bureaucracy between optimists and pessimists in assessing what had happened in Vietnam up to early 1969 when the survey was completed. While some of these differences have become public knowledge, especially with publication last year of the Pentagon Papers, which carried the war history up to 1968, this study reveals how these differing viewpoints were extended into the Nixon administration.

Two broad schools of assessment emerged among the policy planners. In the first group, more optimistic and "hawkish," were the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U.S. military command in Vietnam, the Commander in Chief of Pacific forces, and the American Embassy in Vietnam headed by Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Often conflicting with the judgment of those advisers was a second grouping composed of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The first grouping, the summary of the study says, generally took a hopeful view of current and future prospects in Vietnam, with State, Defense and the

CIA "decidedly more skeptical about the present and pessimistic about the future."

These are some of the major disclosures in the summary:

- "Sound Analysis" of the effectiveness of American B-52 bomber strikes against enemy forces (B-52 strikes are currently being conducted for the first time against the North Vietnam heartland and on a different strategic rationale) was rated "impossible" to achieve. However, "the consensus is that some strikes are very effective, some clearly wasted, and a majority with indeterminate outcome."

- In early 1969, the optimists concluded that on the basis of programs then in existence, it would take "8.3 years" more "to pacify the remaining contested and Vietcong controlled population of South Vietnam. The pessimists estimated it would take "13.4 years" more to achieve that goal.

- In "sharp debate" over the validity of the "domino theory" consequences of a Communist takeover in Vietnam, military strategists generally accepted that rebounding principle, but most civilian experts concluded that while Cambodia and Laos could be endangered fairly quickly, the loss of Vietnam "would not necessarily unhinge the rest of Asia."

- On Soviet and Chinese military aid to North Vietnam, the Joint Chiefs and the U.S. military command in Saigon said that "if all imports by sea were denied and land routes through Laos and Cambodia attracted vigorously," North Vietnam "could not obtain enough war supplies to continue." But CIA and the Office of Defense, "in total disagreement," concluded that "overland routes from China alone" could supply North Vietnam with sustaining war material, "even with an unlimited bombing campaign."

President Nixon's subsequent actions in Vietnam have been more in accord with the pessimists' view of the war than with the optimists' view.

in this study, "although his public explanations of his actions have reflected more of what the optimists were claiming in 1969."

In the process, the President cut U.S. forces in South Vietnam from over a half million at the time he took office to about 80,000 today.

While the NSC summary discloses sharp disagreements three years ago on the effectiveness of U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, the current battlefield situation in Vietnam is much different from the situation in early 1969 and U.S. airpower is being applied in different ways.

In contrast to the guerrilla attacks or hit-and-run actions by larger units which have dominated the enemy's strategy until now, the current Communist offensive is much more like a conventional battle with tanks, artillery and massed troop concentrations standing and fighting.

Thus, it is reasoned officially, bombing now is more important and potentially more effective because big conventional battles need large quantities of fuel and ammunition to be sustained for more than a few weeks.

The NSC summary outlines sharp differences of opinion in early 1969 over the fighting capabilities of Saigon's forces, the importance of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville as a major entry point for enemy supplies, and the overall effectiveness of U.S. bombing.

To a surprising extent, the document portrays the Pentagon's civilian hierarchy within the Office of the Secretary of Defense as more cautious and skeptical in all of the major assessments affecting the future course of the fighting than the U.S. Military Command in Saigon or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The document also seems to make clear that it was Defense Secretary

'69 Report to Nixon

Was Split on War

A Kissinger Study

By Spencer Rich

Washington Post Staff Writer

In what could prove a virtual replay of the Pentagon papers dispute, a government study of the Vietnam war—prepared for President Nixon just after he took office three years ago—is being circulated here and has come into the possession of several reporters and publications.

The unpublished report was put together under the direction of presidential aide Henry A. Kissinger.

It was designed to help lay out policy alternatives in Vietnam for the new Nixon administration. It was completed in February, 1969.

Titled "Responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1," the document concentrates on the political and military situation in North and South Vietnam.

Although different government agencies making evaluations all responded somewhat differently to the basic questions posed, the document in general concludes that while bombing had a substantial impact, it was not playing a decisive role in the war.

Reports of the existence of a "Kissinger study"—called "NSSM-1" for short—began to circulate on Capitol Hill last week. The study was quoted by columnist Jack Anderson in newspapers yesterday. A discussion of the document, along with several purported excerpts, also appears in the current issue of Newsweek magazine.

Several copies of the document are believed to be circulating in Washington. One has been obtained by The Washington Post.

A copy is said to be in the possession of Sen. Mike Gravel (D-Alaska). Gravel hopes to read it into the Congressional Record on the Senate floor today.

Regardless of its classification the document would become privileged and part of the public record if Gravel succeeds in obtaining permission to make it part of the official Senate debate.

It was Gravel who, only nine months ago, obtained a copy of the then-classified Pentagon papers from a private source and read them into the record of a hastily called subcommittee meeting shortly after their publication had begun in The New York Times. The repercussions of that act are still echoing, as the Justice De-

partment—while conceding Gravel's congressional immunity—nevertheless sought to question his aides about the incident. The case was argued before the Supreme Court only last week.

Gravel's reading of the Pentagon papers, at a subcommittee meeting that many senators felt was illegally called, angered a number of senators. His reading of the Kissinger-NSSM study today is likely to rekindle some of that resentment.

The NSSM-1 study was ordered by the Nixon administration on Jan. 21, 1969—

as one of its first acts after coming to office on a pledge to end the war.

Kissinger apparently posed 28 questions about the war and the bombing. They sought to determine the ability of the enemy forces to keep up their flow of material to the battle areas, enemy forces to continue fighting and to keep up their flow of materiel to the battle areas.

The answers were provided by the CIA, Defense Department and State Department, and they varied widely.

The CIA, in one of its reports, quoted by Newsweek, said, "The air war did not seriously affect the flow of men and supplies to Communist forces in Laos and South Vietnam. Nor did it significantly erode North Vietnam's military defense capability or Hanoi's determination to persist in the war."

Kissinger's 1969 National Security Study Memo: The Questions

Following is the text of a draft summary of responses to National Security Study Memorandum 1. It was prepared in early 1969 by various government agencies in answer to questions submitted by presidential adviser Henry Kissinger and his staff (guide to abbreviations at end of text):

VIETNAM QUESTIONS

Environment of Negotiations

1. Why is the DRV in Paris? What is the evidence?

Among the hypotheses:

- Out of weakness, to accept a face-saving formula for defeat.
- To negotiate the withdrawal of U.S. (and NVA) forces, and/or a compromise political settlement, giving a chance for NLF victory in the South.
- To give the U.S. a face-saving way to withdraw.
- To undermine the GVN and U.S./GVN relations, and to relieve U.S. military pressure on both North and South Vietnam.
- Out of desire to end the losses and costs of war on the best terms attainable?

2. What is the nature of evidence, and how adequate is it, underlying competing views (as in the most recent NIE on this subject, with its dissenting footnotes) of the impact of various outcomes in Vietnam within Southeast Asia?

3. How soundly-based is the common belief that Hanoi is under active pressure with respect to the Paris negotiations from Moscow (for) and Peking (against)? Is it clear that either Moscow or Peking believe they have, or are willing to use, significant leverage on Hanoi's policies? What is the nature of evidence, other than public or private official statements?

4. How sound is our knowledge of the existence and significance of stable "Moscow" and "Peking" factions within the Hanoi leadership, as distinct, for

example, from shifting factions, all of whom recognize the need to balance off both allies? How much do we know, in general, of intraparty disputes and personalities within Hanoi?

NVA/VC

5. What is the evidence supporting various hypotheses, and the overall adequacy of evidence, relating to the following questions:

- Why did NVA units leave South Vietnam last summer and fall?
- Did the predicted "third-wave offensive" by the NVA/VC actually take place? If so, why did it not achieve success?
- Why are VC guerrillas and local forces now relatively dormant? (Among the hypotheses:

- 1) response to VC/NVA battle losses, forcing withdrawal or passivity; 2) to put diplomatic pressure on U.S. to move to substantive talks in Paris; 3) to prepare for future operations; and/or 4) pressure of U.S. and allied operations.)

6. What rate of NVA/VC attrition would outrun their ability to replenish by infiltration and recruitment, as currently calculated? Do present operations achieve this? If not, what force levels and other conditions would be necessary? Is there any evidence they are concerned about continuing heavy losses?

7. To what relative extent do the U.S./RVNAF and the NVA/VC share in the control and the rate of VC/NVA attrition; i.e., to what extent, in terms of our tactical experience, can heavy losses persistently be imposed on VC/NVA forces, despite their possible intention to limit casualties by avoiding contact?

(Among the hypotheses:

- Contact is predominantly at VC tactical initiative, and we cannot reverse this; VC need suffer high casualties only so long as they are willing to accept them, in seeking contact; or

rates can be maintained by present forces--as in-

creased X% by Y additional forces -- whatever the DRV/VC choose to do, short of further major withdrawal.)

8. What controversies persist on the estimate of VC Order of Battle; in particular, on the various categories of guerrilla forces and infrastructure? On VC recruiting, and manpower pool? What is the evidence for different estimates, and what is the overall adequacy of evidence?

9. What are NVA/VC capabilities for launching a large-scale offensive, with "dramatic" results (even if taking high casualties and without holding objectives long), in the next six months? (e.g., an offensive against one or more cities, or against most newly "pacified" hamlets.) How adequate is the evidence?

10. What are the main channels for military supplies for the NVA/VC forces in SVN, (e.g., Cambodia and/or the Laotian panhandle)? What portion of these supplies come in through Sihanoukville?

A. What differences of opinion exist concerning extent of RVNAF improvement and what is evidence underlying different views? (e.g., compare recent CIA memo with MACV views.) For example:

a. Which is the level of effective, mobile, offensive operations? What results are they achieving?

b. What is the actual level of "genuine" small-unit action in ARVN, RF and PF; i.e., actions that would typically be classed as such within the U.S. Army, and in particular, offensive ambushes and patrols? How much has this changed?

c. How much has the officer selection and promotion system, and the quality of leadership, actually changed over the years (as distinct from changes in paper "programs")? How many junior officers hold commissions (in particular, battlefield commissions from NCO rank) despite lack of high school diplomas?

d. What known disciplinary action has resulted from ARVN looting of civilians in the past year (for example, the widespread looting that took place last spring)?

e. To what extent have past "anti-desertion" decrees and efforts lessened rate of desertion; why has the rate recently been increasing to new highs?

f. What success are the RF and PF having in providing local security and reducing VC control and influence in rural populations?

11. To what extent could RVNAF--as it is now--handle the VC (Main Force, local forces, guerrillas), with or without U.S. combat support to fill RVNAF deficiencies, if all NVA units were withdrawn:

- If VC still had Northern fillers.
- If All Northerners (but not regroupees) were withdrawn.

12. To what extent could RVNAF--as it is now--also handle a sizeable level of NVA forces:

- With U.S. air and artillery support.
- With above and also U.S. ground forces in reserve.
- Without U.S. direct support, but with increased RVNAF artillery and air capacity?

13. What, in various views, are the required changes in RVNAF command, organization, equipment, training and incentives, in political environment, in logistical support, in U.S. modes of influence -- for making RVNAF adequate to the tasks cited in questions 9 and 10 above? How long would this take? What are the practical obstacles to these changes, and what new U.S. moves would be needed to overcome these?

PACIFICATION

14. How much, and where, has the security situation and the balance of influence between the VC and NLF actually changed in the countryside over time, contrasting the present to such lack of a high school diploma?

CONTINUED

25 APR 1972 STATINT

Approved For Release 2001/03/04 : CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350074-3

Gravel Blocked in Bid

To Reveal Viet Study

By ORR KELLY and
RONALD SARRO
Star Staff Writers

Sen. Mike Gravel, D-Alaska, today was blocked in an attempt to put into the Congressional Record a secret 1969 national security report on the Vietnam war which he says shows President Nixon's decisions were made solely to save "political face."

Gravel took the Senate floor shortly after 10 a.m. saying he had studied the report and found there was no information in it which would jeopardize the safety of the United States.

His move to put the report in the Record was stopped by Sen. Robert Griffin of Michigan, assistant Senate Republican leader, who expressed strong objection to making public a secret document.

Excerpts from the study were published yesterday by Newsweek magazine and columnist Jack Anderson and this morning by the Washington Post.

Study No. 1

Aides to Gravel said the published papers are a summary of a much more extensive document the senator has in his possession.

They said the papers in Gravel's possession involve all or a major part of National Security Study Memorandum No. 1, which was ordered by President Nixon the day after he took office on Jan. 20, 1969.

The papers published in the Post show the President was given a decidedly pessimistic view of the situation in Vietnam — more gloomy in some ways, in fact, than the way events have developed.

He was told that, even with planned improvements, the South Vietnamese armed forces might not even be able to cope with the local Viet Cong on their own, let alone deal with main force North Vietnamese units; that completion of the pacification program would take from 8.5 to 13.4 more years and that the enemy seemed both willing and able to make up his heavy

losses and continue fighting indefinitely.

"All agencies agreed," the report said, "that RVNAF (Republie of Vietnam Armed Forces) could not, either now or even when fully modernized, handle both the VC and a sizeable level of NVA forces without U.S. combat support in the form of air, helicopters, artillery, logistics and some ground forces."

In the Senate today, Griffin said he considers it "very unfortunate if (Gravel) should seek to take it upon himself solely to be the judge of the classification or declassification" of secret documents.

Gravel said the document shows that in formulating his Vietnamization policy, Nixon's one and only concern was "to save face . . . the political face of one individual."

On Vietnamization, Gravel said, "Everyone advising the President at that time advised him that the policy wouldn't work" and the President was told it had not worked in the past.

He likened Nixon's actions to those of "dictators and monarchs of the past."

At a press conference afterwards, Gravel said, "It is still my intention to release every last stiteh of this paper to the American people." But he added that he would have to await "developments" to see how that could be done.

The report, Gravel said to the press, is divided into two sections — 30 pages on bombing policy (from which he quoted today on the floor of the Senate) and 450 pages on the Vietnamization policy.

Gravel indicated that he would move cautiously because of "rumors" that Sen. William B. Saxbe, R-Ohio, would move to censor him if he violated Senate rules in making the classified information public.

Gravel was distributing to all senators today sections of the report dealing with bombing, and was expected to pass out the larger sections on Vietnamization tomorrow. Three

senators received copies this morning.

Copies of document sections were distributed to the Washington offices of presidential candidates, most on the road campaigning. A Gravel aide said the senator had discussed the report with Sen. George S. McGovern of South Dakota, a leading eontender for the Democratic presidential nomination.

Gravel said that he would try again to introduce the over-all document to the Senate at the close of debate this afternoon, and had asked for another 15 minutes tomorrow morning to enter it in the Congressional Record.

Gravel's attempt to read the papers to the Senate raised anew the controversy that developed last summer when he made public a voluminous portion of the so-called Pentagon papers.

In a major test of the powers of Congress in relation to the executive and judicial branches of the government, the Supreme Court has been asked to rule whether aides to the senator can be questioned by a grand jury about the release of the documents.

The new papers appear to be much less controversial than the Pentagon papers. But they provide considerable detail about differences within the government over the situation in Vietnam in the early days of 1969 and over the course that should be followed by the United States. Most of those arguments within the government have previously been made public.

The excerpts from the documents printed by the Post contain a series of 28 questions about the situation in Vietnam apparently posed by Henry A. Kissinger, the President's adviser on National Security affairs, and a summary of response from the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the military command in Vietnam.

Although there were sharp differences of opinion on some points — with the JCS and the CIA on one side and the Office of

the Secretary of Defense, the State Department and the CIA taking a more cautious or pessimistic view — the over-all view given to the President was decidedly on the pessimistic side about the situation in Vietnam.

Although the identity of the person or persons who made the study available to Gravel and some of the news media was not revealed, the timing seemed to indicate it was done by someone opposed to the heavy resumption of the bombing of North Vietnam ordered by Nixon.

The papers show a sharp disagreement over the effectiveness of the bombing then being conducted — in South Vietnam and in the panhandle of Laos, but not North Vietnam. The disagreement included both the effectiveness of the B52 bombing in South Vietnam and the effect of attacks in the Laotian panhandle.

The summary published by the Post does not contain an assessment of the bombing of the North, which was stopped by President Lyndon B. Johnson at the end of October 1968. But Anderson's column yesterday said the report in his possession "gives a devastating appraisal of the ineffectiveness" of the Johnson bombing campaign.

"There is little reason to believe that new bombing will accomplish what previous bombings failed to do, unless it is conducted with much greater intensity and readiness to defy criticism or risk of escalation," he quoted a State Department contribution to the study as saying.

The problem of stopping the flow of supplies to the enemy was illustrated by an estimate in the papers published by the Post that the enemy needed a flow of only 80 tons a day from outside the country, or only about two large truckloads.

Since that time, the situation has changed significantly; however. The North Vietnamese have brought a considerable amount of heavy equipment, including tanks and large guns, into South Vietnam and are thus more dependent on a steady flow of fuel, ammunition, spare parts and replacements than they were in 1968 and 1969.

CIA-RDP80-01601R000300350074-3